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ABSTRACT

This paper provides an analysis of certain key factors affecting the supply and demand for teachers and the efficiency of their utilization and motivation as these factors occur in developing nations around the world. The factors examined are: control and status; salaries, bonuses, and fringe benefits; recruitment, assignment, and transfer practices; size and location of schools; and relations between public and private education. A number of recommendations are made based on the analysis of existing policies including: remotivating teachers in post; limiting absenteeism; attracting young people to education; improving the level of qualifications of teachers; and reducing the deficiencies of teachers in certain subjects. An appendix containing a number of tables is included, as is a 13-item list of references. (DB)

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WHAT POLICIES FOR TEACHERS ?

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WHAT POLICIES FOR TEACHERS?

Introduction

Recent research has underlined the impact on achievement of factors linked to teachers (i.e. *time for learning*, determined by the length of the official school year and the proportion of time lost throught teachers/students absenteeism and other factors - *level of knowledge - pedagogical skills*). Without questioning the contribution of textbooks and learning materials, it reminds us of the key role of teachers in the learning process and of the importance of efficient combination of resources. This reminder is an opportune one at a time when deterioration of conditions of the teaching profession seems to be accelerating and when generalisation of basic education and improvement of quality are priority objectives. These trends are cause for concern not only from the viewpoint of motivation of teachers but also as regards the concept of public education itself.

Due to its size and characteristics (distribution by level of education and training, subject, duration of service, sex..) the teaching corps constitutes both the major constraint and the principal resource for education. The attrition rate is usually between 1 and 5%, (although it may be higher in countries where teachers conditions have deteriorated rapidly) so that half the current teaching staff might still be in service at the end of this century, even if by expansion of the teaching corps, it may represent much less than half the total by that time. Very high numbers of new teachers will have to be trained and recruited mainly in countries where access to basic education is still low. Any policy for teachers should thus aim at re-motivating them, improving their utilisation wherever possible while containing increases of the salary bill within acceptable limits. Such policy should take into account the characteristics of the labour market: under-payment of teachers can be very costly in the long term as it will contribute to inefficiency and instability. It should also seek to maintain an acceptable balance between the salary bill and expenditures devoted to textbooks, learning materials, and maintenance and repair of buildings.

This analysis will be limited to certain key factors affecting the supply and demand for teachers, efficiency of their utilisation and their motivation: control and status; salaries, bonuses and fringe benefits; recruitment, assignment and transfer practices; size and location of schools; relations between public and private education.

1. *Control and status*

(i) Decisions in favour of decentralisation (and its modalities) or for centralisation depend, however, on a number of considerations:

For decentralisation:

Ghana : To mobilise resources at the local level and reduce pressure on public resources (at the same time trying to ensure uniformity of standards and a minimum salary level for teachers, with special bonuses for those in difficult areas) (1).

Chile: To transfer pre-school, primary and secondary education to municipalities in order to increase private financing and to "disengage" the state from the domain of education. Teachers who were civil servants benefitting from a status and salary scales fixed at the national level had to choose between two options: continuing to be paid according to salary scales of the civil service, with the corresponding promotion possibilities, or choosing private sector conditions (negotiation of salary and promotion between employers and employees). In both cases, however, teachers were no longer part of the civil service and received severance pay due to them on leaving the civil service.(2)

Mexico: To transfer negotiations with the teachers' union from the federal level to that of the state (3).

For centralisation:

Philippines: To implement a basic reform of secondary education and ensure minimum standards of salary (in certain schools, salaries are not paid on time or even fully) and of quality in secondary schools of the district (Barangay), of towns, municipalities and provinces. This evolution, which is contrary to the general trend towards decentralisation in the country, is considered as a provisional phase before returning again to decentralisation (1).

Decentralisation of basic education, in those countries having recently chosen this formula, has sometimes resulted in decentralisation of recruitment and management of teachers but not necessarily any questioning of the unicity of their status and salary scales (Colombia after the law on the *Situado fiscal* in 1973; Mexico in the states having chosen to decentralise); Chile is the only country where decentralisation has brought about a diversification in the status and salary scales of teachers. Centralisation, where it takes

place, always on the other hand entails the institution of a single status and uniform salary scales for the whole of the country (Philippines, nationalisation of secondary education in 1987).

In countries where control and financing of basic education comes under the responsibility of the regional/local level, one generally finds:

• more marked disparities in resources and quality than in centralised countries (4)

• disparities amongst teachers' salaries (see below, 2. Salaries, bonuses and fringe benefits...)

• reduced geographic mobility.

(ii) In most countries, the unicity of the *status* (whether belonging or not to the civil service) and the professionalisation of the teaching corps, are the result of long historical evolution. The aspirations engendered by this status and by the continual increase in levels of education and training of new teachers has, however, caused the assignment and maintaining in post of teachers in rural areas to be more difficult, given the living and working conditions there.

Diversity of status still persists in some countries, for example Brazil, where teachers working in the public sector may be recruited by the Federation, the states and the municipalities according to three types of contracts, i.e.

• *Permanent staff*, belonging to the civil service, benefitting from indeterminate contracts and salary scales fixed by the administrative level to whom they are responsible.

• *Temporary staff*. The three administrative levels of the public sector employ teachers for short periods, under the employment law (CLT) which governs all workers in the country. Their contracts may be terminated at any moment.

• *Staff working under the "receipt" regime*. In a great number of municipalities in the North East, teachers may be recruited without any contract. They receive a nominal remuneration for their work and have no legal protection. The only proof they have of employment is the receipt for their remuneration, in which it is indicated that they are teachers.

The situation obviously results in very wide disparities of salary and quality.

2. *Salaries, bonuses and fringe benefits: the incentive structure*

Among the objectives/consequences of salary policies one may mention:

- Re-motivating staff (letting motivation continue to decline).
- Attracting young people to education (discouraging)
- Retaining staff in post (encourage departure)
- Facilitate assignment of teachers to difficult areas (maintain the status quo)
- Reduce deficits of teachers in certain subjects (maintain the status quo)
- Favour in-service training (discourage).

Analysis of salary policy should take into account the entire remuneration of teachers (basic salary, bonuses and fringe benefits in money or kind), in comparison with those of other cadres in the civil service and private sector with the same levels of qualifications. Information available in this domain is, however, very inadequate at present.

(i) *Structure of Salary Scales*: present situation and past trends

Salaries fixed at the national level

As the examples shown in Table 1 appended show, differentials due to seniority are sometimes very important as compared to those linked to qualifications. The salary structure differs widely between countries, which suggests the existence of very diverse policies (see also Table 2 annexed). In a country like Togo, the combined play of the two differentials has allowed a very marked increase in the salaries of a sizeable group of teachers, who, at primary level, have been promoted from monitor to assistant teacher, then to teacher.

Re-evaluation of nominal salaries linked to inflation (see below (ii) evolution of real salaries) has brought about, in almost all countries, a reduction in the differentials due to seniority and qualifications, the highest salaries increasing less quickly in nominal value than the lowest salaries (examples: Indonesia, Philippines, Colombia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia; exceptions: Congo where the 1985 increases favoured higher

education teachers, Togo where percentage increases were the same for all staff, Côte-d'Ivoire, Mexico).

The flows of graduates from the educational system on to the labour market, since the beginning of the 1970s, have completely changed the relations between supply and demand for employment. While this trend may explain partly the general decline in real salaries, it should probably have contributed to a more significant decline in the salaries of the lowest qualified teachers. The fact that salary differentials between different categories of teachers have been reduced more than the adjustements dictated by the market may be explained by different factors: the role of unions; the ideology of african socialism; the fact that losses in purchasing power are more easily accepted by the least paid teachers, if the best paid ones receive less in relative terms.

It is possible that salary scales for the civil service, and in particular the differentials due to level of education/training, are now unsuited to the conditions of the market in some countries.

Salaries determined at the regional/provincial levels

Information available from a limited number of countries shows an extreme diversity of salaries according to the territorial unit:

- In *Colombia*, where salaries were fixed at the departmental level up to the beginning of the 1970s, the differences between departments for primary teachers with the same qualification varied from 50% to more than 100% during the first half of the 1960s; thereafter they progressively decreased and varied only from 25% to 60% in 1972 just before the institution of national scales (5). For secondary teachers, on the other hand, differences tended to increase (they reached from 130% to more than 160% at the beginning of the 1970s).

- In *Brazil*, the differences in remuneration between *states* are even higher (from 1 to 10), as can be seen in Table 3 appended.

Differences in salaries are even more marked when comparing teachers from different networks (federal state, municipalities) *and* status (see above 1. Control and Status). Such a situation tends to attract the best teachers towards the states and networks paying the highest salaries with clear consequences for inefficiency and disparities in quality.

(ii) *Evolution of real salaries*

Analysis of time series (6),(7),(8) (see Table 4 appended) shows a trend to lower real salaries for all scales and at all points on the scales, *since 1970 or even earlier*, in all countries with the exception of Colombia.

In *North Africa and in French-speaking Africa south of the Sahara*, it is known that the decline began at independence with the suppression of bonuses, blocking of salaries and redesigning of scales.

In *English-speaking Africa*, the trend is much the same; the recent drop in countries such as Ghana and Uganda is unprecedented in magnitude.

Most countries of *Latin America* have experienced similar trends, albeit with certain variations, for example:

- in Colombia, where the influence of powerful unions has been able to maintain purchasing power since 1965.

- In Peru, after a steep increase at the beginning of the sixties (nominal salaries were to have doubled in 4 years, but the last two increases were not applied), the decline has been constant, and has even accelerated in recent years.

- In Venezuela, there was some increase in real salaries in the seventies, but the drop since the beginning of the eighties has been very marked.

- Finally, the decline observed in Brazil and in Mexico since the beginning of the eighties has been severe.

As for *Asia*, the situation is more differentiated:

Whereas the purchasing power of teachers in Malaysia and Singapore has risen recently, the evolution noted in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka is similar to that of the other regions.

Even taking account of step increases in salary linked to years of service, real salaries in the *civil service* in Africa have seen a marked decline since 1975 (9) (See Table 5 annexed).

The salary to per capita GDP ratio has generally fallen quite a bit in Africa since 1970 (see Table 6 annexed). While it remains high in certain countries (for example, Côte-d'Ivoire and Togo), in many others (Congo, Zambia, and very likely Ghana, Nigeria, the Sudan and Uganda) it has come down, especially as far as primary school is concerned, to levels comparable to those of other regions. As a result, it is no longer obvious that relative salaries of teachers are, *in general*, too high in Africa. Nevertheless, this situation may persist in some countries (Côte-d'Ivoire) and in higher education (and maybe secondary), because of differentials in the salary scales connected with qualifications, However, one should bear in mind the limitations of comparing the value of this ratio among countries in which the extent of the monetary economy varies substantially.

Interpretations of this evolution vary according to the region:

In *Africa*, three main factors explain the trends observed:

- post-colonial adjustment, which ended towards the beginning of the 70s in North Africa, but much later in Sub-Saharan Africa.

- the rapid increase in the number of secondary and post-secondary graduates, in the presence of much weaker labour demand, especially as of the second half of the seventies,

- the economic crisis and structural adjustment, starting at the beginning of the eighties.

In *Latin America and in Asia*, only the latter two factors should be taken into consideration.

Contrary to what is sometimes rather too hastily asserted, the erosion of teachers' purchasing power is not a recent phenomenon, due mainly to the crisis; in many countries this trend dates back much further, but *has been aggravated* since 1980 by the crisis and by structural adjustment.

More generally, the evolution of real salaries may be interpreted as a long-term reaction by the State to particularly strong demand for education, constrained by limited elasticity of public resources. For some people, this trend reflects the excessive role played by the State in many countries and its limited ability to manage efficiently resources.

No direct evidence is available on the consequences of these trends, but it is probable that they have brought:

- a decline in motivation (absenteeism, less participation in the classroom)

- search for other sources of income, in teaching (increase in number of teachers occupying two full time posts, see below (iii) bonuses and fringe benefits, or carrying out part time teaching, see below 6. Relations between public and private education; strategies to increase demand for private courses paid by the more well off families ...) or other

- pressure for more rapid internal promotions

- departure for other activities offering better prospects (with a possible increase in the attrition rate).

Certain manifestations of a decline in motivation, such as absenteeism, may however be linked to other factors: living and working conditions in difficult areas, sundry administrative problems (salary payments), absence of inspection/supervision in the field.

(iii) *Bonuses, fringe benefits and advantages associated with the status of teachers*

The bonuses and fringe benefits from which the entire civil service may benefit are very varied: they have tended to proliferate (9). in response to the decline in real salaries. (A good example is that of the evolution of the payment structure of teachers in the Congo - see Table 7 annexed). Although they at present represent, in different countries, a significant proportion of salaries (10), their growth has not been able to offset the decline in real salaries.

Bonuses and fringe benefits would, in addition, be distributed very unequally: on the one hand it is above all the highest ranking staff who receive them and on the other hand, staff of the same rank, do not all receive the same fringe benefits in kind such as housing. Due to the inequalities which arise, this situation creates frustration and tends to diminish the motivation of those staff who are less well treated. Finally,less and less bonuses and fringe benefits have been paid recently and salary payments made behind schedule, due to the state's financial difficulties.

In the majority of developing countries, as in the developed, pensions are based on the distribution system; the value of the pension varies greatly by country (on the basis of remuneration retained as the basis of calculation, the formula applied and the adjustment mechanism for inflation). In certain high inflation countries, adjustment mechanisms are not adequate to protect the real value of the pension, so that staff (and in particular teachers) seek to remain active as long as possible. In the majority of African countries, where mass recruitment of civil servants took place as from the 1960s, the pensions bill will rapidly increase during the next few years and could thus increase the budgetary difficulties of many countries.

Three categories of bonuses and fringe benefits are of particular concern to teachers and can sometimes assume great importance:

- Housing constitutes a particularly important benefit in kind, above all for teachers working in difficult areas. Construction is carried out, according to the country, either by the public sector or by the local communities. When the state is not able, for financial reasons, to give housing to all teachers, an alternative solution consists of allocating a housing allowance (Senegal), so that the situation for all teachers is equitable.

- Teachers assigned to difficult areas may receive a higher salary (variable salary scales according to area or province - hardship allowances), or benefit from other advantages (more rapid upgrading, possibility of early retirement). In Morocco, for example, the increase in basic salary on assignment to a more difficult area is 8 to 10% according to seniority and qualification level.

- The overtime system in the majority of French speaking African countries, ensures additional pay for all teachers who exceed their set hours. This possibility has been greatly exploited at secondary level, during the period when teachers were lacking so as to limit the recruitment of foreign teachers whose salaries were 2 to 4 times higher than those of national teachers. This practice is still current to offset the lack of teachers in science subjects and more generally, to ensure the balance between supply and demand for teachers by subject at the institutional level.

Some advantages, which benefit to teachers, by their status, may be quite significant:

- In some countries (Algeria, Côte-d'Ivoire) teachers are better paid than other civil servants of the same degree level. In Côte-d'Ivoire, the differential is equivalent to 40% of basic salary.

- Possibility of promotion (and the benefits accruing) represent for teachers, in a great number of countries, a decisive advantage in comparison to other civil servants, who in general benefit much less from such opportunities.

Finally, the income derived from private courses given to students may represent a very significant share of the total income of some teachers.

3. *Recruitment, assignment and transfer practices*

Though there is still a lack of teachers, notably in certain subjects in some countries, one may give examples of numerous countries where, overall, there is an excess of teachers.

This situation may be the result of numerous causes which tend sometimes to mutually reinforce each other:

- Existence of a large number of unemployed teachers and pressure exerted on the government for their recruitment.

- Political nepotism translated into a surplus of recruitments compared to the needs of the service.

- Pressure exerted by teachers' unions to impede the discharge of teachers (where demand declines or when a lower birth rate entails a decline in enrolments).

In Brazil, the surplus of teachers has been shown by two researches:

A study carried out by IIEP in 1980 in a sample of primary and secondary institutions in the states of Bahia and Parana, has shown that non teaching staff expenditures represent 30 to 40% of current total expenditure, because of the existence of numerous teachers assigned to administrative tasks (8).

A study carried out by the Federal Ministry of Education in 1986 demonstrated the extent of expenditure on the administrative structure and its variability by state: while in Piaui the administrative cost per pupil was 23 US$ and represented 70% of the unit costs in the first cycle, it was only 15 US$ in the state of Sao Paulo, that is 7% of the corresponding unit cost (11). As the authors note, there was one staff member per 422 pupils in Sao Paulo and one for 136 pupils in Piaui.

A recent study (12) shows that, in a sample of 9 Latin American countries, from 10 to more than 20% of primary teachers are occupied in administrative and supervision tasks (only Cuba and the Dominican Republic are the exceptions at 2%).

In the Côte-d'Ivoire, the surplus of primary teachers is shown by comparing their total number and the number in post in classrooms, administration or as pedagogical advisers. A little more than 5% of the total staff cannot be classified in any of these categories (unpublished document IIEP 1986).

In Mexico, the drop in the birth rate for several years has brought a regular decline in primary enrolments. However, because of the agreements between the Secretariat for Public Education and the teachers' union, all the graduates of the public and private teaching colleges had to be given a post. The only way of getting out of this impasse consisted of drastically reducing admissions to the teaching colleges: for some years; however, students who were in the pipeline have continued to be recruited after graduation (3).

In Togo, the surplus of teachers in the lst, 2nd and 3rd cycles is the result of the fact that recruitment continued from 1980/81 to 1983/84 when enrolments declined quite markedly from 1980/81 to 1984/85 (13). In 4 years, the pupil teacher ratio fell 20% in primary and 45% in secondary.

A study carried out in a sample of 70 institutions of the 2nd and 3rd cycle in Togo in 1986 (unpublished documents, IIEP) shows that the average weekly teaching load per teacher was 14.7 hours in general education colleges and 13.9 hours in the general education lycées, while the respective norms were 22 and 18 hours.

The number of teachers available in institutions in comparison to enrolments, varies widely according to region and environment (urban, rural). One may see a relative surplus of teachers in the large towns, the more favoured regions and the best institutions while there is a relative scarcity in rural areas, in distant regions with difficult living conditions and in poorly equipped institutions. This situation leads to poor utilisation of the teaching staff from three points of view:

• under-utilisation of teachers in the surplus institutions and over-utilisation in the institutions operating under conditions of scarcity.

• The teaching, by certain secondary staff, of subjects for which they are not trained.

• Inefficient utilisation of qualified teachers who are too concentrated in a limited number of institutions.

Amongst the *causes* which explain this state of affairs, one may mention:

• the differences in living conditions according to place of assignment;

• the difference in working conditions and opportunities for complementary activities according to the place of assignment;

• relative constraints on assignment and transfer of staff : in many countries it is not possible to transfer a teacher if he is not in agreement with the proposed new assignment; even if it was theoretically possible, the administration does not always have the means to impose its will nor the resources necessary to implement measures (credits for housemoving); teachers married to civil servants have to be assigned in the same town as their spouses, which leads sometimes to a concentration of female teachers in the capital.

• the poor management of the teaching corps.

This problem may be illustrated by *the extent of the disparities between institutions* (in secondary) of two indicators governing utilisation of teachers: the average number of pupils per class and the weekly teaching load per teacher in the institutions. These disparities depend to a certain extent on the effects of size (the values of the two indicators tend to increase with the size of the institution) but they also depend to a large degree on the distribution process of teachers to institutions. Table 8 appended shows the average and the coefficient of variation of the two indicators calculated for a sample of secondary institutions of the lst and 2nd cycle. The coefficient of variation of the average teaching hours is very high in certain countries, showing the wide *disparities of utilisation amongst institutions*. *The diversity of situations between countries* is very marked, notably for the weekly teaching hours. Control of the deployment process of teachers seems to vary a great deal according to the country.

4. *Size and location of schools.*

Small size institutions do not in general permit satisfactory utilisation of teachers. It is on this basis that different formula for primary teaching in areas of low population density (multigrade classes, enrolment of pupils every two years, etc.) and for secondary education (teachers trained to teach two subjects, overtime, part time teachers etc.)

Data available (see Tables 9 & 10 annexed) give a quite precise idea of the real utilisation of teachers in *secondary education* according to size of institutions in certain countries:

- as a general rule, the number of pupils per class increases significantly with the size of the institution;

- the rate of utilisation of teachers is low in small institutions (less than 400 pupils). Above this size, there is a tendency for utilisation to stabilise.

The size of primary schools in rural areas is often small; for Latin American countries the average is 65 pupils per school (39 in Brazil, 75 in all the other countries). A high proportion of these schools are not complete, because of the low density of the population and the absence of classes for several levels. The fact that the schools do not give all the study years may explain the limited size of the institutions and the early drop-out of pupils (12).

5. *Relations between public and private education*

The existence of a dual labour market for teachers (public and private education) may have different consequences on the supply and demand for employment and the efficiency of utilisation of teachers in each market.

In Indonesia, for example, non public education (subsidised, assisted and private) is very developed, above all in the lst and 2nd cycle of secondary, and very diversified from the point of view of quality of education and of the level of school fees (8). Analysis of the results of a study carried out by IIEP in 1980 in a sample of 350 secondary public, subsidised, assisted and private schools shows that:

- The level of teachers' salaries in the public sector is relatively low and their average rate of utilisation inadequate (from 70 to 80%) with very high coefficients of variation between schools and within schools.

• Non public schools to a very great extent make use (60 to 80% of teaching hours) of part time teachers who are badly paid and most of whom are full time teachers in the public sector. The same situation exists in public schools but with a lesser participation of part time teachers and a higher remuneration.

In sum, the maintenance of rather low salaries in the public sector has led teachers to search for means of earning supplementary income by working part time in other public schools (or even in their own school) or in private schools. This salary policy tends to favour the under-utilisation of teachers in public schools (the existing differences with private schools are very significant) and indirectly to subsidise private education.

6. *The Options*

One of the clearest conclusions of this note is the necessity, before proceeding to consider the options, of undertaking an in-depth analysis of the conditions of employment and pay of teachers in public and private education, and of their consequences on the size, characteristics and deployment of the teaching corps. This analysis should take account of conditions in the labour market for cadrés of the same level in the civil service and in the private sector.

It is, however, probable that the structure of remuneration and incentives, which has not been revised in many countries for some years while conditions on the labour market have profoundly changed, should be progressively adapted.

This revision should be based on desired changes for the teaching corps (re-motivation of staff and upgrading of their status; attracting young people into education; reduction of specific deficiencies; improvement of efficacity of deployment..) and of the input mix (number of hours teaching per pupil and per day; number of working days per year; level of knowledge of teachers...). The impact of the envisaged measures on the salary bill and total current expenditures should be studied.

It is necessary to make a distinction between *general measures and specific measures* for teachers:

General measures aim at improving conditions for all teachers, if that is seen to be necessary after a study of the market. They concern general increases in salaries and improvement of certain fringe benefits (more equitable re-evaluation of pensions to keep pace with inflation for example). Up to the present, in deciding whether to increase salaries or increase employment, decisions have usually favoured increase of employment. Is the maintaining of such a policy justified? If the salary levels of

teachers, including bonuses and fringe benefits, and taking into account stability of employment are markedly inferior to those of the market, and have as a consequence low motivation, a high attrition rate and the impossibility to fill certain posts, and *if*, in parallel, there exist phantom posts and underused teachers, the case for an increase in salaries associated with staff rationalisation measures is well founded. It is possible that particular and limited measures over time would have no effect, while a global policy of upgrading salaries and improving efficacity over the long term, could stabilise the teaching corps and attract more dynamic young people to education. The ensemble of pension conditions for teachers should also be reviewed in certain countries, when they are less favourable than in the private sector and when they result in keeping teachers at work at an advanced age, for example, because mechanisms to keep pace with inflation are not adequate. These changes could provide the opportunity also for reflection on the advantages of detachment or re-attachment of teachers to the civil service.

Specific measures aim at particular objectives; they may or may not be complementary to general measures.

(a) *Remotivating teachers in post*

Several options may be envisaged, in addition to general measures:

- improve the career prospects of teachers, by opening up more promotion possibilities

- increase the number of steps in each salary scale, and the differentials for seniority, in order to give better prospects of increases over a longer period without having to leave teaching

- offer to teachers in post some possibilities for supplementary adequately paid work (cost per hour lower but in reasonable proportion to the cost of a full time teacher)

- upgrade the status of teachers by measures that recognise and promote their contributions

- improve working conditions in the classroom.

(b) *Limit/control absenteeism*

In addition to options aiming at improving motivation, one may envisage:

- payment at the local level of teachers assigned to areas where access is difficult
- recruitment of teachers at the local level; however, this option should be examined in liaison with decisions on the status and control of teachers
- reinforcement of numbers of inspectors/supervisors and improvement of their working conditions (means of transport, travel expenses..).

(c) *Attracting young people to education*

In addition to general measures to upgrade salaries, one might envisage increases in salary linked to seniority which are higher or more frequent at the beginning of careers. However, possible consequences should be taken into account (departure to other work after some years, depending on the possibilities offered by the labour market).

(d) *Improving the level of qualifications of teachers*

In certain countries, there is an excess of supply in the public sector for the least qualified posts and an insufficient supply for the highest qualified posts. This situation, linked to the salary policy of the public sector and to the characteristics of the labour market, has negative consequences on the global performance of the public sector. After an in-depth analysis of employment in the public sector, it might be found justified to increase the differentials for certain qualifications (to increase certain scales more in nominal terms than others). This question should however be studied at the same time as differentials for seniority are considered.

(e) *Reducing deficiencies of teachers in certain subjects*

When these deficiencies are met by appointing non qualified teachers (or by those trained to teach other subjects), or by a reduction in teaching hours, it may be useful to consider the following options:

- Institute specific bonuses, rather than separate salary scales.

• Agree to part-time teaching by specialists working in the civil service or in the private sector (payment by the hour, at a preferential rate *at least equal* to the cost per hour of full time teaching of the same qualification).

(f) *Improving the deployment of teaching staff*

Depending on the principal constraints limiting the efficiency of deployment, several measures may be envisaged:

• *Assignment of teachers in difficult areas*

Three types of option are open for consideration:

- training and recruitment of teachers at the local level

- increase in salary, bonuses and /or fringe benefits aiming at *cpcompensating for the opportunity cost* of assignment in the area where living conditions are difficult, access to basic services is limited, opportunities of additional revenue inexistant (specific salary scales, hardship allowances, more rapid upgrading, early retirement, housing built by the public sector or by the community...)

- deprofessionalisation of the teaching corps linked to development of non-formal education. India, for example, has experimented a system of reorientation and upgrading of young people who failed their final secondary examination in order to make them instructors of family type schools where children receive two hours' instruction a day. These instructors also give non formal evening courses and literacy programmes for adults. Their remuneration represents 40% of a primary teacher's salary for taking at least two groups of pupils. Successful instructors are encouraged to improve their levels of education and may finally be appointed as teachers, under the condition that they continue to work in the same rural village.

• *Transfer of teachers*

Different complementary measures may be envisaged:

- include credits in the budget for housemoving of transferred staff (such a measure is much less costly than paying surplus staff)

- institute mobility bonuses, when the administration requires the transfer, and under conditions to be determined

- reconsider regulations governing transfers within the framework of global negotiations with unions or professional associations for teachers.

• *Improve the information system on the staff and its utilisation*

• *Improve the process for assignment of teachers at the beginning of the school year*

• *Rationalize recruitment practices*

(g) Improve the performance of staff

Is it desirable and possible to institute a system of internal promotion of staff according less recognition to seniority and more to efficiency? Even if such possibilities exist (see for example, promotion by seniority and by decision), their extreme forms (payment of teachers by results) have almost unanimously been rejected. Might one conceive of intermediate forms acceptable to unions and in which *the risks of arbitrary decisions would be limited*? At the present time, the majority of salary scales are conceived so as to permit reaching the last step at the end of a career of 20 to 25 years. In certain cases, on the other hand (Indonesia for example), it is possible to pass from one scale to the next at the end of a minimum number of years (6 to 8) so that the speed with which salaries increase may vary significantly for individuals having begun in the same conditions.

Finally, rationalizing the use of teachers and suppressing phantom positions have to be given some priority, not only because of their impact on expenditure but because it would be a first step in a process of change of the administrative culture and would contribute to improve the image of the public service. Besides, it might be a key prerequisite to get more public resources for education.

It is vital that more complete and precise information should be available in order to analyse and compare the experiences of different countries in this domain; it is in effect no longer possible to continue to make marginal adjustments when attempting to respond to present problems of recruitment and remuneration policy for teachers.

APPENDIXES

Table 1 Variation of salaries according to seniority and qualification

Extent of difference	Seniority(1)	Qualification(2)	Qualification(3)
Less than 20%	Lebanon (all categories)	Lebanon	
20% to less than 40%	Zambia (lower cat. primary & secondary) Morocco (primary)		Indonesia
40% to less than 60%	Madagascar (primary) Morocco (secondary)		Madagascar Congo Rwanda Morocco
60% to less than 80%	Zambia (higher cat. primary)	Madagascar	Togo Zambia Côte d'Ivoire
80% to less than 100%	Côte d'Ivoire (lower category lower secondary)	Côte d'Ivoire	Lebanon
100% and more	Congo (all cat.) Rwanda (") Côte d'Ivoire (higher cat. primary upper secondary) Togo (") Indonesia (all cat.) Madagascar (secondary)	Togo Rwanda	

(1) Difference between salaries at the beginning and end of career

(2) Difference between salaries at the beginning of career of the least qualified and the most qualified primary teacher

(3) Difference between salaries at the beginning of a qualified primary teacher and of a teacher of 2nd cycle secondary

TABLE 2
Relation between the salaries (beginning of career)
of different categories of teachers

	Primary			Secondary		Higher
	Monitor	Assistant	Teacher	1st cycle sec. teacher	2nd cycle sec. teacher	University Professor
Congo						
1970	-	-	100	134,7	163,4	-
1975	-	-	100	133,9	161,8	339,2
1980	-	-	100	133,9	161,8	339,2
1985	-	-	100	127,9	152,3	483,2
Côte d'Ivoire						
1965	-	100	150,0	157,1	192,9-233,3	442,9
1975	-	100	176,7	220,0	236,6-280,0	633,3
1980	-	100	183,6	255,2	271,6-310,5	761,2
1985	-	100	183,6	255,2	271,6-310,5	844,0
Indonesia						
1970	-	-	100	137,8	154,1	208,9
1975	-	-	100	137,8	154,1	208,9
1980	-	-	100	126,9	133,0	160,8
1985	-	-	100	120,5	126,3	145,9
Togo						
1970	100	170,2	266,0	340,4	436,2	-
1975	100	"	"	"	"	-
1980	100	"	"	"	"	-
1985	100	"	"	"	"	-
Zambie						
1970	-	-	100	167,0	212,5	-
1975	-	-	100	131,4	195,7	-
1980	-	-	100	130,5	206,7	-
1985	-	-	100	121,6	175,4	-

Table 3. Variation in salaries between states Brazil
(network of state schools. Value in NCZ per month, June 1989)

	Primary teachers		Teachers with first degree	
	Value	Index	Value	Index
Lowest salary (state of Alagoas)	81.4	100	81.4	100
Highest salary (state of Roraima)	465,0	571	874,0	1074

Table 4. Median salaries in constant prices

	Primary				Secondary				Higher			
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985
Togo	100	80	66	50	100	80	66	50	100	80	66	50
Zambia	100	103	80	55	100	94	77	41	100	92	74	40
Côte d'Ivoire	100	124	88	57	100	132	101	60	100	108	81	53
Congo	100	76	43	29	100	75	44	28	100	75	45	41
Colombie	100	123	92	103	100	123	92	103	-	-	-	-
Mexico (1)	-	100	63	47	-	100	71	35	-	-	-	-
Indonésia	100	42	26	41	100	42	25	39	100	42	22	33

1. Base 100 in 1976

TABLE 5

Index of base salaries, whithout and with step increases in different african countries, 1985
(1975 = 100)

Countries	Grade	Base salary(1)	Base salary including step increases
Benin	B	43,2	54,8
	H	43,2	63,0
Central African Republic	B	48,9	66,0
	H	36,9	54,0
Ethiopia	B	62,6	81,4
	H	31,3	31,3
Gambia	B	39,5	50,1
	H	36,3	43,6
Kenya	B	58,2	87,6
	H	42,2	50,3
Mauritania	B	60,6	...
	H	43,8	...
Maroc	B	66,3	73,8
	H	53,1	75,0
Niger	B	46,2	...
	H	46,2	...
Nigeria	B	42,2	46,4
	H	25,3	27,7
Sierra Leone	B	23,4	23,8
	H	16,0	18,0
Somalia	B	5,2	5,2
	H	4,0	4,0
Sudan	B	74,1	83,0
	H	58,1	58,1
Tanzania UR	B	22,9	23,8
	H	18,8	18,8
Togo	B	58,1	84,0
	H	58,1	78,2
Zimbabwe	B	150,6	161,5
	H	58,1	58,1

B = 1st step, lower salary
H = 1st step, highest salary

Table 6. Median Salaries in GDP per capita

	Primary (1)				Secondary (2)				Higher (3)			
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985	1970	1975	1980	1985
Togo	17,9	13,7	12,0	11,0	29,4	22,4	19,6	18,0	-	-	-	-
Zambia	4,6	4,7	4,4	3,5	8,6	8,1	8,0	5,0	11,0	10,1	9,9	6,3
Côte d'Ivoire	-	16,2	10,3	9,9	-	20,3	13,7	13,2	-	44,6	30,2	28,9
Congo	12,2	6,0	3,4	1,6	16,1	7,8	4,4	2,0	-	18,6	10,5	6,6
Colombia	3,0	3,1	2,1	2,4	3,0	3,1	2,1	2,4	-	-	-	-
Mexico (1)	-	2,7	1,3	1,2	-	4,8	2,6	1,6	-	-	-	-
Indonésia	-	3,8	1,5	2,0	-	5,4	2,0	2,8	-	7,1	2,1	3,0

1. Highest qualified teachers in Primary Education
2. Qualified teachers in 2nd cycle of Secondary Education
3. Professors in Higher Education

Tableau 7 EVOLUTION DE LA STRUCTURE DE REMUNERATION DES ENSEIGNANTS

NIVEAU	COMPOSANTES	PRINCIPE D'APPLICATION	ANNEE D'INSTAURATION
F.I, F.II, S.	1.- Rémunération de base	- Dernier diplôme obtenu ___ Grille indiciaire	- 1960
	2.- Complément de rémunération	- Inversement proportionnel à l'indice de base	- 1975
	3.- Element dégressif	- Inversement proportionnel à l'indice de base	- 1981
	4.- Indemnité de pléthore	- 22500 par an à partir de 70 élèves par classe	- 1981
	5.- Indemnité de fidélité à l'enseignement	- Ancienneté dans l'enseignement	- 1981
	6.- Indemnité régionale	- Affectations autre qu'à Brazzaville Pointe-Noire, NKayi ___ 6000 CFA/mois	- 1982
	7.- Allocations familiales	- 1200 FCFA/Enf/mois	
Supérieur	1. Rémunération de base	- Nf Décrets	- 1975
	2. Complément de rémunération	-"- -"-	- 1985
	3. Elément dégressif	-"- -"-	-"-
	4. Indemnité de fidélité	-"- -"-	-"-
	5. Prime de logement	-"- -"-	-"-
	6. Prime de recherche	-"- -"-	-"-
	7. Allocations familiales	-"- -"-	-"-

Table 8

Number of pupils and teaching hours per week per teacher: Average and coefficient of variation

	1st cycle secondary				2nd cycle secondary			
	Pupils per class		Hours per teacher		Pupils per class		Hours per teacher	
	Average	Coefficient of variation	Average	Coefficient of variation	Average	Coefficient of variation	Average	Coefficient of variation
Algeria	--	--	--	--	38,4	0,08	15,8	0,04
Maroc	37,0	0,07	19,2	0,05	36,3	0,12	18,7	0,04
Sudan	52,5	0,15	15,9	0,17	56,0	0,12	15,1	0,20
Colombia	42,1	0,29	19,4	0,14	40,2	0,24	19,8	0,16
Indonesia	46,9	0,37	19,7	0,56	40,0	0,27	17,7	0,69

Source : C. Tibi. 1987. Les déterminants des coûts. op. cit.

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Table 9

Pupils per class (A) and rates of utilization of teachers (B) according to size of school

		Less than 200	200 to 400	400 to 800	800 to 1200	1200 to 1600	1600 to 2000	2000 and more	Total
Algeria	A	-	35,6	36,6	37,6	38,6	38,9	42,8	8,4
(2nd Cycle)	B	-	86,2	84,5	87,2	88,1	89,4	89,0	87,6
Morocco	A	33,0	42,9	35,6	36,7	37,0	37,2	37,5	37,0
(1st cycle)	B	56,1	85,6	91,1	90,7	91,7	93,2	92,8	91,5
Indonesia	A	36,3	38,0	44,6	46,4	42,8	65,8	-	46,9
(1st cycle)	B	54,4	75,8	78,3	85,4	107,1	79,2	-	81,7
Indonesia	A	-	35,1	38,6	37,7	46,5	57,7	-	40,0
(2nd cycle)	B	-	40,0	70,8	55,0	56,7	60,4	-	59,2

Table 10

Pupils per class (A) and average weekly number of teaching hours per teacher (B) according to size of school

		Less than 200	200 to 400	400 to 600	600 to 800	800 to 1000	1000 to 1600	1600 to 2200	2200 and more	Total
Sudan	A	46,2	52,3	57,6	54,7	--	--	--	--	52,5
	B	15,8	15,1	16,6	17,5	--	--	--	--	15,9
Sudan	A	52,2	58,0	54,5	56,7	--	--	--	--	56,0
(Second.Ed.)	B	14,0	12,3	17,4	15,8	--	--	--	--	15,1
Togo	A	36,9	38,8	39,1	49,3	--	--	--	--	40,8
(2nd cycle)	B	12,6	14,8	13,1	16,0	--	--	--	--	14,2
Togo	A	22,1	28,2	33,7	36,2	--	--	--	--	31,7
(3rd cycle)	B	12,1	12,8	13,8	15,6	--	--	--	--	14,7
Colombia	A	24,6	32,8	35,4	37,5	41,1	42,7	43,1	55,7	40,3
(1st cycle Secondary)	B	19,1	19,2	19,9	20,0	19,0	20,8	19,3	19,2	19,7

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